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When Can an Employee Sue for the Bad FaithFailure to Pay
Benefits Providedby a Collective BargainingAgreement?
by Jay E. Grenig

Allis-Chalmers Corporation
V.

Roderick S. Lueck
(Docket No. 83-1748)
ArguedJanuary 16, 1985
The comprehensive regulation of industrial relations
by Congress has given rise to difficult problems of federal-state relations. The task of accommodating the imperatives of the federal scheme with the diverse and
particular local needs of the states has generally been
left to the courts. Here, the Supreme Court is called
upon to consider whether an employee can bypass the
grievance arbitration procedure provided in a labor contract and bring an independent state tort action over an
employer's alleged bad faith failure to pay a contractual
disability benefit in a timely fashion. Its decision will
have a significant affect on employees, employers and
labor organizations throughout the country.
ISSUE
At issue in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck is the extent to
which the states may by applying their own laws, determine the legal consequences of conduct related to the
breach of obligations arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, this case involves the question of whether federal labor law prevents an employee
from suing an employer in state court for the employer's
alleged bad faith delay in making disability benefit payments provided by a collective bargaining agreement. It
also questions whether an employee is required to go
through the collective bargaining agreement's grievance
procedure before bringing suit in state court.

FACTS
Roderick S. Lueck was employed by Allis-Chalmers.
After suffering a nonwork-related back injury (while
carrying a pig to a pig roaster at a friend's house), he
applied for disability benefits. The health and disability
plan was funded by Allis-Chalmers and administered by
an insurance company. The disability plan was incorporated by reference in a collective bargaining agreement
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between Allis-Chalners and the United Auto Workers.
The agreement provided that questions regarding the
disability plan were to be resolved in accordance with a
three-step grievance procedure culminating in binding
arbitration.
Although Lueck received payments under the disability plan, benefit payments were stopped for a portion of his disability period. Lueck sued Allis-Chalmers
and the insurance company in state court, alleging that
Allis-Chalmers and the insurer had intentionally, contemptuously and repeatedly stopped the disability payments. He sought $10,000 in compensatory and
$300,000 in punitive damages. Lueck did not grieve or
attempt to grieve the interruption of disability benefits.
Responding to the action Allis-Chalmers claimed
that Lueck's claim was preempted by section 301 of the
Federal Labor Management Relations Act, and that it
was also barred because Lueck had not exhausted his
contractual remedies before bringing suit. The trial
court granted Allis-Chalmer's motion for a summary
judgment and Lueck appealed. Relying on principles of
state insurance law involving bad faith conduct by insurance carriers, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
the trial court. It held that any violation of the labor
agreement was irrelevant to the issue of bad faith handling of Lueck's disability claim and that Lueck's complaint was not preempted by section 301.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The extent to which Congress has comprehensively
regulated industrial relations and has thus displaced
state laws has been a matter of frequent and recurring
concern. In determining when state action must yield to
federal authority, the Supreme Court generally considers the impact of the state action on the entire scheme of
federal labor law.
Section 301 of the Federal Labor Management Relations Act provides that suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements may be brought in federal court.
Interpreting section 301, the United States Supreme
Court has held that state and federal courts deciding
cases involving claims arising from a collective bargaining agreement must apply federal law derived from
national labor policy. The federal labor policy was construed as being designed to promote stable and uniform
labor relations and to encourage use of dispute resolution procedures.
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Under this policy, employees wishing to assert claims
covered by a contractual grievance procedure must attempt to use that procedure before resorting to the
courts. Permitting individual employees to sidestep the
grievance procedure would deprive the employer and
union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive
method for settling employee grievances in all orderly
way.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Lueck, the
decision would signal that employees have all avenue of
redress in addition to or instead of the grievance procedure provided in a collective bargaining agreement.
Employers and unions could be faced with litigating
state court claims they thought would be resolved under
the grievance procedure. Not only might this reduce the
popularity of grievance arbitration provisions in industrial relations, but it would open the way for employees
to recover substantial punitive damages from employers--a type of damages labor arbitrators rarely award.
Such a decision, upholding the state supreme court,
could also result in other state court rulings that employees covered by collective bargaining agreements also
have a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge.
A reversal of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision could be seen as reemphasizing the federal labor
policy that the desirable method for settling disputes
arising under a collective bargaining agreement is the
dispute resolution process agreed upon by the employer
and the union.

ARGUMENTS
For Allis-Chalmers Corporation (Counsel of Record, Theophil
C. Kammholz, 115 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, IL, 60603; telephone (312) 781-2300)
1. Because both the employee's rights to disability benefits and remedies for infringing such rights are governed by a labor contract with a grievance procedure
culminating in final and binding arbitration, the employee was required to exhaust labor contract remedies before bringing suit in state court.
2. State law cannot be an independent source of employee rights under collective bargaining agreements
since to hold otherwise would undermine principles
of uniformity and consistency which are cardinal to
applying federal labor law.
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For Roderick Lueck (Counsel of Record, Gerald S. Boisits,
606 W. Wiwonsin Avenue, Suite 1906, Milwaukee, IV)
53203; telephone (414) 277-0377)
1. An employee who seeks damages for the outrageous
and reckless manner in which lie was treated and not
the recovery of disability benefits under a labor contract may sue in state court without exhausting reme(lies provided under the labor contract.
2. Because the employee's relationship with the employer was one of insured and insurer, the state was
free to regulate this relationship.
3. The state has an overriding interest in allowing the
employee's claim, as the state's interests are deeply
rooted in local feelings and responsibility and not in
the collective bargaining agreement.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Allis-ChalmersCorporation
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
filed an ainicus brief in support of Allis-Chalmers, arguing that the action in this case was a section 301 claim
since Lueck was entitled to disability benefits only by
virtue of the negotiated contract. Tile Chamber of Conimerce asserts that the national labor policy of peacefully
resolving disputes through grievance arbitration procedures would be undermined if the state court's action
were upheld.
The AFL-CIO also filed an amicus brief in support
of Allis-Chalmers, asserting that, even if Lueck's action
in state court were considered as a wrong independent
of any contract breach, the tort action is preempted by
federal law because of the state's attempt to regulate the
legal consequences of the parties' signing a labor contract governed by section 301. Arguing that tile Wisconsin tort of bad faith is merely a rule of extraordinary
damages for willful breaches of insurance contracts, the
AFL-CIO contends that under section 301, it is for federal law to determine the remedies available for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement.
In Support of Roderick Lueck
The states of Wisconsin and Hawaii filed in anicus
brief siding with Lueck. They assert Lueck's rights do
not turn on a meaning or interpretation to be placed on
a contract, but on common law tort rules imposing fiduciary obligations on insurers of disability pay claims.
The states argue that the federal interest in controlling
the dispute resolution relationship between all employer
and union is peripheral to the state's interest in requiring a good faith disposition of' undisputed matters involving individual employees.
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